Ukraine: conflict at the crossroads between Europe and Russia (2023)

introduction

Ukraine has long played an important, if sometimes overlooked, role in the global security order. Today, the country is at the forefront of a renewed great-power rivalry that many analysts say will dominate international relations for decades to come.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 marked a dramatic escalation of the eight-year conflict that began with Russia's annexation of Crimea and marked a historic turning point for European security. A year after the fighting, many defense and foreign policy analysts called the war a major strategic mistake by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Many observers see little prospect of a diplomatic solution in the coming months, instead acknowledging the potential for a dangerous escalation that could involve Russia's use of a nuclear weapon. The war has accelerated Ukraine's drive to align itself with Western political blocs, including the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Why is Ukraine a geopolitical hotspot?

Ukraine became a battleground in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea and began arming and supporting separatists in the country's southeastern Donbass region. The Russian conquest of Crimea marked the first time since World War II that a European state had annexed the territory of another. More than 14,000 people were killed in fighting in the Donbass between 2014 and 2021, Europe's bloodiest conflict since the Balkan wars of the 1990s. The hostilities marked a marked change in the global security environment from a unipolar period of US domain to one defined byrenewed competition between the great powers[PDF].

In February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine with the goal of overthrowing the Western-leaning government of Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

What general interests does Russia have in Ukraine?

Russia has deep cultural, economic, and political ties to Ukraine, and Ukraine is, in many ways, central to Russia's identity and vision for itself in the world.

family ties. Russia and Ukraine have strong family ties that go back centuries. kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, is sometimes called the "mother of Russian cities" in terms of cultural influence with Moscow and Saint Petersburg. Christianity was brought from Byzantium to the Slavic peoples in kyiv in the 8th and 9th centuries. And it was Christianity that served as an anchor for Kievan Rus, the first Slavic state from which modern Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians hail.

Russian diaspora. According to a census conducted this year, some eight million ethnic Russians lived in Ukraine in 2001, mainly in the south and east. As a pretext for its actions in Crimea and Donbas in 2014, Moscow claimed that it had a duty to protect these people.

superpower image. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Russian politicians saw the divorce with Ukraine as a historic mistake and a threat to Russia's position as a great power. Losing lasting control over Ukraine and placing it in the Western orbit would be seen by many as a major blow to Russia's international prestige. In 2022, Putin described the escalation of the war with Ukraine as part of a broader fight against Western powers, which he says are intent on destroying Russia.

Crema. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev transferred Crimea from Russia to Ukraine in 1954 to strengthen "fraternal relations between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples." However, since the collapse of the Union, many Russian nationalists in both Russia and Crimea have longed to return to the peninsula. The city of Sevastopol is the home port of the Russian Black Sea Fleetdominant maritime powerin the region.

Act. Russia has long been the largest in Ukrainebusiness partner, though that connection has withered dramatically in recent years. china finallyOvertook Russia in tradewith Ukraine. Before invading Crimea, Russia hoped to lure Ukraine into its single market, the Eurasian Economic Union, which now includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

Energy. For decades, Moscow relied on Ukrainian pipelines to pump its gas to customers in Central and Eastern Europe, paying Kiev billions of dollars a year in transit fees. The flow of Russian gas through UkraineContinued in early 2023However, despite hostilities between the two countries, volumes have been reduced and pipelines remain at serious risk.

political influence. Russia has been keen to maintain its political influence in Ukraine and throughout the former Soviet Union, particularly after its 2004 candidate for Ukraine's presidential ranks, Viktor Yanukovych, lost to a reformist competitor as part of the popular Orange Revolution movement. This blow to Russia's interests in Ukraine came after a similar electoral defeat for the Kremlin in Georgia in 2003, known as the Rose Revolution, and was followed by another, the Tulip Revolution, in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. Yanukovych he then became Ukraine's president in 2010 amid voter dissatisfaction with the Orange government.

What triggered Russia's moves in Crimea and Donbas in 2014?

It was Ukraine's relations with the EU that raised tensions with Russia in 2013/14. In late 2013, under pressure from his supporters in Moscow, President Yanukovych rejected plans to formalize closer economic relations with the EU. At the same time, Russia had put pressure on Ukraine to join the not-yet-established EAEU. Many Ukrainians viewed Yanukovych's decision as a betrayal by a deeply corrupt and incompetent government, sparking nationwide protests known as Euromaidan.

Putin described the subsequent Euromaidan riot that ousted Yanukovych from power as a Western-backed "fascist coup" that endangered Crimea's ethnic Russian majority. (Western leaders dismissed this as baseless propaganda reminiscent of the Soviet era.) In response, Putin ordered a covert invasion of Crimea, which he later justified as a ransom. "Everything has a limit. And with Ukraine, our Western partners have crossed the border," Putin said.one direction March 2014Formalization of the annexation.

Putin used a similar narrative to justify his support for separatists in southeastern Ukraine, another region that is home to large numbers of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers. He referred to the area as Novorossiya (New Russia), a term that dates back to 18th-century Imperial Russia. Armed Russian provocateurs, including some agents of the Russian security services, are believed to have played a key role in inciting the rebellion of anti-Euromaidan secessionist movements in the region. Unlike Crimea, however, Russia continued to officially deny involvement in the Donbass conflict until it launched its broader invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Why did Russia launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022?

Some Western analysts see the 2022 invasion of Russia as the culmination of the Kremlin's growing resentment of NATO's post-Cold War expansion into the former Soviet sphere of influence. Russian leaders, including Putin, have claimed that the United States and NATOrepeatedly breaking promises they have madeIn the early 1990s, the alliance failed to expand into the former Eastern Bloc. They view NATO expansion at this turbulent time for Russia as a humiliating impertinence they can only watch.

In the weeks leading up to the 2008 NATO summit, President Vladimir Putinwarned US diplomatsthat moves to bring Ukraine into the alliance would be "a hostile act towards Russia". Months later, Russia went to war with Georgia, apparently demonstrating Putin's willingness to use force to protect his country's interests. (Some independent observersGeorgia complainedfor starting the so-called August War, but accused Russia of intensifying hostilities).

Although Ukraine remained a non-member, it expanded its ties with NATO in the years leading up to the 2022 invasion. Ukraine held annual military exercises with the alliance and in 2020 became one of six Enhanced Opportunity Partners, a special status for the bloc's closest non-member allies. Furthermore, kyiv reaffirmed its goal of eventually gaining full NATO membership.

In the weeks leading up to its invasion, Russia madeseveral important safety requirementsUnited States and NATO, including halting expansion of the alliance, obtaining Russian approval for certain NATO deployments, and removing US nuclear weapons from Europe. Alliance leaders responded that they were open to the new diplomacy but were unwilling to discuss closing NATO's doors to new members.

“While in the United States we are talking about aUkraine crisisFrom a Russian perspective, this is a crisis in the European security architecture," said CFR's Thomas Graham.gun control todayin February 2022. "And the fundamental issue they want to negotiate is the revision of the European security architecture as it stands now, towards something more conducive to Russian interests."

Other experts have said that perhaps the most important motivating factor for Putin was his fear that Ukraine would continue to evolve into a modern, Western-style democracy, which would inevitably undermine his autocratic rule in Russia and dash his hopes of rebuilding a Russian-led sphere. . would influence Eastern Europe. "[Putin] wantsdestabilize Ukrainescare Ukraine," writes historian Anne Applebaum in theAtlantic. “He wants Ukrainian democracy to fail. He wants the Ukrainian economy to collapse. He wants foreign investors to flee. He wants his neighbors, in Belarus, Kazakhstan, even Poland and Hungary, to doubt that democracy is viable in their countries in the long term."

What are Russia's goals in Ukraine?

Putin's Russia has been described as a revengeful power eager to regain its former power and prestige. "Putin's goal has always been to restore Russia to the status of a great power in northern Eurasia," writes Gerard Toal, a professor of international affairs at Virginia Tech, in his booknear abroad. "The ultimate goal was not to recreate the Soviet Union, but to make Russia great again."

By conquering Crimea in 2014, Russia consolidated its control of a strategic foothold on the Black Sea. With a larger and more sophisticated military presence there, Russia can project its power deeper into the Mediterranean, Middle East and North Africa, where it has traditionally had limited influence. Some analysts argue that Western powers have failed to impose significant costs on Russia in response to the annexation of Crimea, which they say has only increased Putin's willingness to use military force to further his foreign policy goals. Until its invasion in 2022, Russia's strategic gains in Donbass were more fragile. Supporting the separatists had strengthened, at least temporarily, his bargaining power with Ukraine.

In July 2021, Putin wrote an article that many Western foreign policy experts found sinister.explains his controversial viewsof common history between Russia and Ukraine. Among other things, Putin described the Russians and Ukrainians as "one people" effectively occupying "the same historical and spiritual space."

Throughout the year, under the auspices of military exercises, Russia rallied tens of thousands of troops along the border with Ukraine and later in ally Belarus. In February 2022, Putin ordered a full-scale invasion, during which a force of some 200,000 troops crossed from the south (Crimea), east (Russia) and north (Belarus) into Ukrainian territory in an attempt to capture the main cities. including the capital kyiv, and depose the government. Putin said the overall goals were to "denazify" and "demilitarize" Ukraine.

However, in the first weeks of the invasion, the Ukrainian forces put up a staunch resistance, which was successful.to stop the Russian armyin many areas, including kyiv. Many defense analysts say the Russian military suffered from low morale, poor logistics and ill-considered military strategy that assumed Ukraine would fall quickly and easily.

In August 2022, Ukraine launched a major counteroffensive against Russian forces and recaptured thousands of square kilometers of territory in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions. The campaigns were a huge setback for Russia. In the midst of the Russian withdrawal, Putin ordered the mobilization of some 300,000 more troops, illegally annexed four more Ukrainian regions andthreatened to use nuclear weaponsto defend the "territorial integrity" of Russia.

In the months that followed, fighting focused on several fronts in the Donbass, with Russia employing a new tactic of attacking civilian infrastructure in several distant Ukrainian cities, including Kiev, with rocket and drone strikes. At the start of the war, Western officials estimated that there were over a hundred thousand Ukrainiansdead or wounded, while Russian losses were probably even higher, possibly double. By now around eight million refugees had fled Ukraine and millions more were internally displaced. Before the spring thaw, Ukraine's western allies pledged to send more sophisticated military aid, including tanks. Most security analysts see little chance for diplomacy in the coming months, as both sides have strong reasons to continue the fight.

What were the US priorities in Ukraine?

Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Washington's priority was to pressure Ukraine, along with Belarus and Kazakhstan, to give up its nuclear arsenal so that only Russia would keep the former union's weapons. At the same time, the United States hastened to strengthen Russia's tottering democracy. Some prominent observers at the time felt that the United States was premature in this courtship of Russia and that it should do more to promote geopolitical pluralism in the rest of the former Soviet Union.

Former US National Security Adviser Zbigniew BrzezinskiExternal relationshipsdescribed a healthy and stable Ukraine as such in early 1994critical counterbalance to Russiaand the lynchpin of what he stood for would be the new post-Cold War American grand strategy. “It cannot be overstated that without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine's subservience and subservience, Russia automatically becomes an empire,” he wrote. In the months after the publication of Brzezinski's article, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia pledged in the Budapest referendum to respect Ukraine's independence and sovereignty in exchange for its becoming a non-nuclear state.

Twenty years later, when Russian troops occupied Crimea, restoring and strengthening Ukraine's sovereignty once again became a top US and EU foreign policy priority. After the 2022 invasion, the US and NATO allies dramatically increased defense, economic and humanitarian aid to Ukraine and tightened their sanctions against Russia. However, Western leaders have been careful to avoid actions they believe would drive their countries into war or escalate it, which in extreme cases could pose a nuclear threat.

timeline

Ukraine's struggle for independence in the shadow of Russia

1991-2022

see timeline

What are the US and EU policies on Ukraine?

The United States remains committed to restoring Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty. It does not recognize Russia's claims to Crimea or the other regions illegally annexed by Russia. Before the 2022 invasion, the United States supported a solution to the Donbass conflictthe minsk agreements[PDF].

Western powers and their partners have taken many steps to increase aid to Ukraine and punish Russia for its 2022 offensive. As of February 2023, the United States has provided more than $50 billion in assistance to Ukraine, including advanced military assistance such as missiles and missile systems, helicopters, drones and tanks. Several NATO allies are providing similar assistance.

Meanwhile theInternational Sanctionsin Russia they have expanded enormously, covering much of the financial, energy, defense and technology sectors and targeting the assets of wealthy oligarchs and others. The US and some European governments have also excluded some Russian banks from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, a financial messaging system known as SWIFT; restrictions on Russia's ability to access its vast foreign exchange reserves; and blacklisted the Central Bank of Russia. In addition, many influential Western companies have ceased or ceased to operate in Russia. The Group of Eight, now known as thegroup of seven, suspended Russia indefinitely from its ranks in 2014.

The invasion also cost Russia its long-awaited Nord Stream 2 pipeline after Germany suspended its regulatory approval in February. Many critics, including US and Ukrainian officials, rejected the pipeline as it was being developed, claiming it would give Russia greater political influence in Ukraine and in the European gas market. In August, Russia indefinitely suspended operations of Nord Stream 1, which supplied the European market with up to a third of its natural gas.

What do the Ukrainians want?

Russia's aggression in recent years has increased public support for the westernization of Ukraine. After Euromaidan, the country elected billionaire businessman Petro Poroshenko, a staunch supporter of EU and NATO integration, as president. In 2019, Zelenskyy defeated Poroshenko in a sign of deep public dissatisfaction with the political establishment and its faltering fight against corruption and the oligarchic economy.

Before the 2022 offensive, polls showed that Ukrainians had mixed opinions about it.NATO and EU membership. More than half of those polled (excluding residents of Crimea and beleaguered eastern regions) were in favor of EU membership, while 40-50 percent were in favor of joining NATO.

Just days after the invasion, President Zelenskyy called on the EU to put Ukraine on the fast track to membership. However, the country became an official candidate in June 2022.experts warnthat the accession process could take years. In September of the same year, Zelenskyy presentedformal application for Ukrainejoin NATO and push for an expedited admission procedure for this bloc as well. Many Western analysts say that, similar to Ukraine's EU bid, NATO membership does not look likely any time soon.